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A LONG-AWAITED REBOOT: THE FIFA 
SCANDAL AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS FOR 
FOOTBALL’S GOVERNING BODY 
MATTHEW B. DICENSO* 
Abstract: On May 21, 2015, Swiss authorities raided the annual congression-
al meeting of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association, ultimately 
arresting seven FIFA executives on charges of corruption. The product of a 
three-year Federal Bureau of Investigation case, the Swiss raid and accompa-
nying Department of Justice indictment was the first step in addressing what 
authorities describe as enduring and systemic corruption within football’s 
governing body. In addition to casting a shadow over the world’s most be-
loved sport, the FIFA scandal highlighted the international organization’s lack 
of accountability and, most notably, its dire need for change. Although the 
February 2016 reform package addressed many of FIFA’s problems, more 
must be done to ensure that history does not repeat itself. 
INTRODUCTION 
Marco Tardelli’s goal and electric celebration in the 69th minute. Croa-
tia’s stunning defeat of Germany in ’98. Pele’s six goals and Brazil’s 
first ever championship in ’58. The battle of East and West Germany in 
’74. Diego Armando Maradona’s magical goal against England in ’86.1 
For the average American, these words likely have little meaning or 
sentimental value.2 That is because a mere six percent of Americans list 
football as their favorite sport.3 For the rest of the world, however, these 
historic dates represent only a few of the most iconic moments in football’s 
biggest spectacle—the World Cup.4 
Unfortunately for football fans, while the sport itself undoubtedly 
boasts a storied and celebrated history, its governing body, the Fédération 
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 1 Nate Kahn, 50 Best Moments in World Cup History, BLEACHER REPORT (Dec. 26, 2011), 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/998092-50-best-moments-in-world-cup-history [https://perma.cc/
942R-25BL]. 
 2 See Ian Bremmer, These Are the 5 Facts That Explain the FIFA Scandal, TIME (June 4, 
2015), http://time.com/3910054/fifa-scandal-sepp-blatter/ [https://perma.cc/8FSB-3L95]. 
 3 Id. 
 4 See Kahn, supra note 1. 
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Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), has a history of its own—a 
history of corruption.5 A three-year case by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) culminated in May 2015 when Swiss authorities arrested top 
FIFA officers at the behest of U.S. officials.6 According to former Attorney 
General Loretta Lynch, the U.S. indictment alleges “rampant, systemic and 
deep-rooted” corruption spanning “at least two generations of soccer offi-
cials.”7 Specifically, the indictment states that FIFA officials rigged bids for 
the World Cup and accepted bribes in exchange for marketing and broadcast 
contracts.8 
Because football is a global sport, the FIFA scandal has the potential to 
ignite a geopolitical fire.9 In response to the arrests of FIFA officials in May, 
Russia, the host of the 2018 World Cup, accused the United States of ille-
gally exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction.10 A statement by the Russian 
Foreign Ministry called on the United States to “stop attempts to make jus-
tice far beyond its borders” and to comply with international legal proce-
dure.11 
In addition to impacting foreign relations, the FIFA scandal could have 
tremendous financial implications.12 The FIFA World Cup, a tournament 
held every four years, is consistently the most-watched sporting event in the 
world, surpassing even the Olympics in viewers.13 In fact, the 1998 World 
Cup had an astounding cumulative audience of 37 billion people.14 Unsur-
prisingly, the World Cup generates huge sums of money for both FIFA and 
the host country.15 Although the payoff of the World Cup can be substantial, 
hosting the event is a massive, and sometimes risky, investment for which-
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Ishaan Tharoor, How FIFA Became the World’s Most Powerful and Loathed Sports 
Organization, WASH. POST (May 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/
2015/05/27/how-fifa-became-the-worlds-most-powerful-and-loathed-sports-organization/ [http://
perma.cc/98AK-EURW]. 
 6 See Owen Gibson & Damien Gayle, Fifa Officials Arrested on Corruption Charges as World 
Cup Inquiry Launched, THE GUARDIAN (May 27, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/football/
2015/may/27/several-top-fifa-officials-arrested [http://perma.cc/8UTB-59YE]. 
 7 Id. (quoting Loretta Lynch). 
 8 Rebecca R. Ruiz, Matt Apuzzo & Sam Borden, FIFA Corruption: Top Officials Arrested in 
Pre-Dawn Raid at Zurich Hotel, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/
sports/fifa-scandal-arrests-in-switzerland.html [http://perma.cc/7C84-REMY]. 
 9 See Bremmer, supra note 2. 
 10 See Russia Accuses US of Illegal Overreach with Fifa Corruption Indictments, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 27, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/may/27/russia-accuses-us-
overreaching-fifa-corruption-indictments [http://perma.cc/LA8Q-L83P]. 
 11 Id. 
 12 See Bremmer, supra note 2. 
 13 Fifa Corruption Crisis: Key Questions Answered, BBC NEWS (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-32897066 [http://perma.cc/KSQ5-6RR6]; Tharoor, supra note 5. 
 14 Tharoor, supra note 5. 
 15 See Bremmer, supra note 2; Fifa Corruption Crisis: Key Questions Answered, supra note 
13. 
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ever country secures the bid.16 For example, although host South Africa 
spent $4.6 billion in preparations, the 2010 World Cup brought in just $500 
million.17 Qatar, host of the 2022 World Cup, is expected to spend nearly 
$200 billion over twelve years preparing its infrastructure.18 Charges of 
rigged bidding for the tournament could have serious consequences for na-
tions like Russia and Qatar, even potentially placing their significant in-
vestments at risk.19 
Part I of this Note provides background on the formation, organization, 
and structure of FIFA. It also outlines the turbulent history of the organiza-
tion’s leaders and discusses the charges of corruption brought against top 
officials. Part II discusses the legal basis for American jurisdiction and out-
lines why jurisdiction is justifiable. Part III situates FIFA within the sphere 
of international law and suggests mechanisms to improve the accountability 
of the organization and its members. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In the early hours of May 27, 2015, Swiss authorities quietly entered 
the Baur Au Lac hotel in Zurich, Switzerland, the site of FIFA’s annual con-
gressional meeting.20 When all was said and done, seven FIFA executives 
were arrested on charges of corruption.21 The initial Department of Justice 
(DOJ) indictment, which stemmed from an FBI case, named fourteen peo-
ple, including current and former football officials and sports-marketing 
executives.22 The U.S.-led corruption case expanded in December 2015, 
when federal prosecutors announced charges against sixteen additional 
FIFA officials, two of whom were arrested by Swiss authorities that same 
day.23 These subsequent charges cited further instances of alleged bribes 
and kickbacks, including payments linked to past tournaments and future 
World Cup qualifiers.24 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See Bremmer, supra note 2. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See id. 
 20 See Matt Apuzzo, Stephanie Clifford & William K. Rashbaum, FIFA Officials Arrested on 
Corruption Charges; Blatter Isn’t Among Them, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/05/27/sports/soccer/fifa-officials-face-corruption-charges-in-us.html [http://perma.cc/
3WX-B2WJ]; Gibson & Gayle, supra note 6. 
 21 Fifa Corruption Crisis: Key Questions Answered, supra note 13. 
 22 Id.; Apuzzo et al., supra note 20. 
 23 Evan Perez & Shimon Prokupecz, U.S. Charges 16 FIFA Officials in Widening Probe, CNN 
(Dec. 3, 2015), http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/03/sport/fifa-corruption-charges-justice-department/ 
[http://perma.cc/P3XD-7PZB]. 
 24 Aruna Viswanatha, Joshua Robinson & John Revill, U.S. Indicts 16 New Suspects in FIFA 
Corruption Case, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2015, 7:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/authorities-
making-new-fifa-arrests-in-switzerland-1449123950 [http://perma.cc/QW8F-4C6H]. 
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Although it may be difficult to imagine otherwise, FIFA was not al-
ways the multi-billion dollar household name that it is today.25 Football’s 
governing body was founded in 1904 by Frenchmen whose goal was to cre-
ate an umbrella organization that could unite the sport’s numerous national 
entities.26 The organization’s principal mission was to support football’s 
global development and arrange international matches.27 The World Cup—
FIFA’s crown jewel—debuted in 1930 and was hosted by Uruguay.28 In 
stark contrast to the modern World Cup, the first tournament was invitation 
only and limited in size.29 In fact, as Washington Post journalist Ishaan 
Tharoor describes, FIFA “was initially a European club and slowly expand-
ed to other corners of the globe.”30 Nearly ninety years later, the World Cup 
is now the most-watched sporting event in the world and brings in billions 
of dollars in revenue.31 Alongside the growth of its main event, FIFA itself 
has grown drastically, now resembling an organization akin to the United 
Nations.32 
Technically a nonprofit, and therefore paying little in taxes, FIFA is 
currently made up of 211 member-nations.33 These 211 members are orga-
nized into six confederations: the Asian Football Conference; the Confeder-
ation of African Football; the Confederation of North, Central American, 
and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF); the South American 
Football Association (CONMEBOL); the Oceania Football Conference; and 
the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA).34 In order to address 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See Tharoor, supra note 5. 
 26 Id.; see History of FIFA—Foundation, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/
history/index.html [http://perma.cc/74JG-TEGA]. Robert Guérin and André Espir of France 
played a critical role in structuring the umbrella organization that would eventually become FIFA. 
See History of FIFA—Foundation, supra. 
 27 Tharoor, supra note 5. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Fifa Corruption Crisis: Key Questions Answered, supra note 13. 
 32 Tharoor, supra note 5. 
 33 Carl Bialik, How FIFA’s Structure Lends Itself to Corruption, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 27, 
2015, 6:43 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-fifas-structure-lends-itself-to-corruption/ 
[http://perma.cc/Y5TP-9CGM]; Tharoor, supra note 5; Associations, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/
associations/ [http://perma.cc/3KTW-7EFG]. FIFA does not pay any tax on World Cup revenue in 
Switzerland due to its non-profit status. Kelly Phillips Erb, World Cup Mania: Figuring Out FIFA, 
Soccer & Tax, FORBES (June 16, 2014, 12:23 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/
2014/06/16/world-cup-mania-figuring-out-fifa-soccer-tax/#79379b171b18 [http://perma.cc/7NRX-
WMVX] Additionally, FIFA is able to acquire favorable tax exemptions from World Cup hosts. 
See Ian Pollock, World Cup: To Tax or Not to Tax?, BBC NEWS (May 11, 2010), http://www.bbc.
com/news/10091277 [http://perma.cc/D7F3-Q8XZ]. 
 34 Map of the World with the Six FIFA Confederations, CHARTSBIN, http://chartsbin.com/
view/owq [http://perma.cc/8JR3-AQ3A]. The six confederations essentially align with the conti-
nents: the Asian Football Conference in Asia, the Confederation of African Football in Africa, the 
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problems brought to light by the recent corruption scandal, the FIFA Con-
gress approved an extensive reform package in February 2016, substantially 
altering the historical structure of the international organization.35 Although 
its headquarters will remain in Zurich, Switzerland, FIFA is now run by a 
president, as well as a Congress, a FIFA Council, a General Secretariat and 
several committees.36 Holding the highest office, FIFA’s president is elected 
every four years by the member associations of the Congress.37 The presi-
dent sits as a member of the FIFA Council and holds the tiebreaking vote.38 
FIFA’s supreme body, the Congress, is made up of delegates from the 211 
member-nations and is tasked with approving the annual report and electing 
the president.39 The Congress holds the power to amend the organization’s 
statutes if necessary.40 The FIFA Council, a body composed of thirty-six 
members and the FIFA President, is responsible for crafting the strategic 
direction of FIFA.41 Because the FIFA Council was designed to replace the 
Executive Committee, which was formerly the primary decision-making 
body of FIFA in the intervals between congressional meetings, members of 
the now-extinct Executive Committee will serve on the Council until the 
end of their existing terms.42 While the FIFA Council is in charge of setting 
the overall strategy, the General Secretariat is entrusted with overseeing the 
actions necessary to implement that strategy.43 
Within FIFA’s system, each of the 211 members of the Congress is be-
stowed with equal voting power.44 That is, regardless of population size or 
                                                                                                                           
Confederation of North, Central American, and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF) in 
North and Central America and the Caribbean, the Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol in South 
America, the Oceania Football Conference in New Zealand and the Pacific islands, and the Union of 
European Football Associations in Europe. Associations, supra note 33. 
35 See The Reform Process, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/governance/how-fifa-works/the-
reform-process.html [https://perma.cc/25VX-K267]. 
 36 How FIFA Works, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/governance/how-fifa-works/ [http://perma.
cc/P5AD-KG3T]; The Reform Process, supra note 35; Who We Are, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/
about-fifa/who-we-are/index.html [http://perma.cc/9SZH-QX4Y]. 
 37 How FIFA Works, supra note 36. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Brittney Balser, The Structure and Policies of FIFA, SOCCER POL. BLOG (2013), http://
sites.duke.edu/wcwp/tournament-guides/world-cup-2014/fifa-institutional-politics/the-structure-and-
policies-of-fifa/ [http://perma.cc/RK47-DUAC]; see Associations, supra note 33. 
 40 Balser, supra note 39. 
41 How the FIFA Council Works, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/fifa-council/how-the-
fifa-council-works.html#2842992 [https://perma.cc/9CD9-XJHS]; The Reform Process, supra note 
35. 
 42 Balser, supra note 39; The Reform Process, supra note 35; Statutory Reforms FAQ—
Extraordinary FIFA Congress, FIFA (Jan. 27, 2016), http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/
affederation/bodies/02/74/76/54/reformsfaq_en_neutral.pdf [https://perma.cc/KBH3-XKZW]. 
 43 The Reform Process, supra note 35. 
 44 Bialik, supra note 33; Associations, supra note 33; How FIFA Works, supra note 36. 
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football prowess, each member is entitled to an equal voice.45 Further, vot-
ing within FIFA is secret, making accountability nearly impossible.46 In 
2011, FIFA changed its rules in favor of a “one member, one vote” system 
to select World Cup hosts.47 Prior to this change, however, the now-
dissolved Executive Committee decided the World Cup host.48 In 2010, the 
Committee chose Russia to host the Cup in 2018, and, controversially, Qa-
tar to host the Cup in 2022.49 Critics of Qatar have pointed to perceived prob-
lems including the country’s average summer temperatures of 105 degrees, 
strict no-alcohol policy, and less than stellar record of worker rights and safe-
ty.50 In fact, Switzerland announced its own separate criminal investigation 
into the awarding of the 2018 and 2022 World Cups to Russia and Qatar, re-
spectively.51 In order to ward off concerns that arose from the Executive 
Committee’s 2010 decision, the FIFA Council recently agreed on a new four-
phase bidding process for the 2026 World Cup.52 This process, consisting of a 
yearlong consultation period followed by three years of “bid preparation” and 
“bid evaluation,” will effectively postpone the vote until 2020.53 
In addition to the FIFA Council, another important body within FIFA is 
the Ethics Committee.54 This independent unit, which predates the February 
2016 reforms, serves as a watchdog for the global football community and 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Bialik, supra note 33. 
 46 David Goldblatt, How FIFA’s Fouls May Revive the Beautiful Game, BLOOMBERG VIEW 
(June 3, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2011-06-03/how-fifa-s-fouls-
may-revive-the-beautiful-game-david-goldblatt [http://perma.cc/PT8S-A4GG]. 
 47 Bialik, supra note 33. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Bialik, supra note 33; see Tony Manfred, 14 Reasons Why the Qatar World Cup Is Going 
to Be a Disaster, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 21, 2014, 1:43 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/qatar-
world-cup-problems-2014-4 [http://perma.cc/G7NA-W7KB]. 
 50 Bialik, supra note 33; Bremmer, supra note 2. Investigations conducted by the Guardian 
revealed serious human rights concerns regarding the treatment of migrant workers developing the 
infrastructure for the 2022 World Cup in Qatar. See Pete Pattisson, Revealed: Qatar’s World Cup 
‘Slaves,’ THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2013, 12:46 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
sep/25/revealed-qatars-world-cup-slaves [http://perma.cc/XQ5L-EMVK]. The investigations brought 
to light a wide array of abuses, including high death rates of workers, forced labor, withholding of 
payment, and confiscation of passports. Id. According to the investigation, migrant workers were 
dying at a rate of almost one a day during the summer of 2013, likely a result of extreme heat and 
deprivation of drinking water. See id. Among other things, Qatar’s strict anti-gay laws and dearth 
of any World Cup-ready stadiums have sparked additional controversy. Manfred, supra note 49. 
 51 Bialik, supra note 33. 
 52 2026 World Cup Hosting Vote Postponed Three Years Until 2020, ESPN FC (May 10, 
2016), http://www.espnfc.us/blog/fifa/243/post/2868917/2026-world-cup-hosting-vote-postponed-
three-years-until-2020 [https://perma.cc/2RXC-MFNJ]. 
53 2026 World Cup Hosting Vote Postponed Three Years Until 2020, supra note 52; FIFA 
Council Agrees on Four-phase Bidding Process for 2026 FIFA World Cup, FIFA (May 10, 2016), 
http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=2016/m=5/news=fifa-council-agrees-on-four-phase-bidding-
process-for-2026-fifa-world--2790472.html [https://perma.cc/2JWD-M2M9]. 
 54 See How FIFA Works, supra note 36. 
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aims to combat proscribed activities including illegal betting and bribery.55 
On December 21, 2015, amidst the U.S. charges and Swiss arrests, the Eth-
ics Committee announced that FIFA president Sepp Blatter would be 
banned from all football-related activities for eight years.56 Michel Platini, 
president of the UEFA, was also handed an eight-year ban.57 These sanc-
tions were in response to Blatter’s alleged payment of millions of dollars to 
Platini.58 
Unfortunately for FIFA and football fans, what the FIFA Ethics Com-
mittee views as an “abusive execution” by Blatter and Platini appears to be 
just one instance among a disturbing trend of executive abuse.59 The three-
year FBI investigation was originally launched in response to the bidding 
process for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups, but was eventually expanded to 
encompass FIFA dealings spanning two decades.60 U.S. authorities have 
charged more than a dozen high-ranking FIFA executives with racketeering, 
wire fraud, and money laundering.61 According to Charles Blazer, cooperat-
ing witness and former CONCACAF general secretary, these corrupt deal-
ings include accepting bribes in exchange for the 2010 South African World 
Cup bid, as well as distributing broadcasting rights to major tournaments in 
exchange for cash.62 The list of executives allegedly involved is fraught 
with football juggernauts, ranging from FIFA’s vice president to leaders of 
football powerhouses like Brazil.63 While the U.S. investigation focuses 
primarily on past corruption, the FBI and Swiss authorities are committed to 
delving deeper into the bidding process behind the Russia and Qatar World 
Cups.64 
In June 2016, Swiss authorities commenced a second raid, this time at 
FIFA’s headquarters in Zurich.65 The search resulted in the seizure of data and 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Id; Independent Ethics Committee, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/committees/
committee=1882034/index.html [https://perma.cc/RTM9-GB4G]. 
 56 Justin W. Moyer, Soccer Czar Sepp Blatter Banned from FIFA for 8 Years, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/12/21/former-
soccer-czar-sepp-blatter-banned-from-fifa-for-8-years/ [http://perma.cc/D2A6-6JMR]. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See Fifa Corruption Crisis: Key Questions Answered, supra note 13. Former CONCACAF 
general secretary and cooperating witness Charles Blazer revealed that bribes were accepted in 
connection with both a Moroccan bid for the 1998 World Cup and broadcasting rights to the 
CONCACAF Gold Cup in 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2003. Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See id. Brazil—a five-time champion—is the only country that has participated in every 
World Cup. FIFA World Cup, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/worldcup/. 
 64 Fifa Corruption Crisis: Key Questions Answered, supra note 13. 
 65 Fifa Headquarters Raided: Swiss Investigators Seize Documents and Electronic Data in 
Criminal Probe, INDEPENDENT (June 3, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-
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physical documents that authorities hope will both confirm past findings and 
lead to new information.66 In addition to the investigations carried out by the 
DOJ, FBI, and Swiss authorities, global law firm Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & 
Sullivan, LLP—hired by FIFA after the May and December arrests—
launched an internal review of football’s governing body.67 The resulting re-
port, released in June 2016, highlighted even more instances of corruption.68 
According to the internal investigation, a trio of FIFA’s former top execu-
tives—Sepp Blatter, Jérôme Valcke, and Markus Kattner—took part in a “co-
ordinated effort” to supplement their incomes by raising their salaries, taking 
bonuses, and modifying the termination clauses of their contracts with 
FIFA.69 To make matters worse, Gianni Infantino, FIFA’s newly elected pres-
ident, is facing allegations that he interfered with FIFA’s independent auditor 
and ordered the deletion of recordings of a FIFA Council meeting.70 
II. DISCUSSION 
It looks very strange . . . . They are accused of corruption—who is? In-
ternational officials . . . it’s got nothing to do with the USA. Those offi-
cials are not US citizens. If something happened it was not in the US and 
it’s nothing to do with them . . . . It’s another clear attempt by the USA to 
spread its jurisdiction to other states.71 
Because Russia was chosen to host the 2018 World Cup, Russian Pres-
ident Vladimir Putin’s criticism of the United States should be viewed wari-
ly.72 All things considered, President Putin, and Russia as a whole, have a 
significant stake in the outcome of the U.S.-led investigation.73 Biased as 
they may be, however, Putin’s comments raise a valid concern.74 After all, 
                                                                                                                           
and-comment/fifa-headquarters-raided-swiss-investigators-seize-documents-regarding-world-cup-
bidding-scandal-a7063776.html [https://perma.cc/EG67-37L8]; see Fifa Corruption Crisis: Key 
Questions Answered, supra note 13. 
 66 Fifa Headquarters Raided, supra note 65. 
 67 Sam Borden & Andrew Das, Sepp Blatter and Deputies Arranged Huge Payouts After 
Indictments, FIFA Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/04/sports/
soccer/fifa-corruption-sepp-blatter-jerome-valcke.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/CD6N-A3U7]. 
 68 See id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id.; Report: Gianni Infantino Could Face Suspension Over Council Recordings, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (June 2, 2016), http://www.si.com/planet-futbol/2016/06/02/gianni-infantino-fifa-
president-suspension-recording-scandal [https://perma.cc/22CC-XQUS]. 
 71 Robert Cryer, FIFA and the Internationalisation of Criminal Justice, OUPBLOG (May 29, 
2015) (alterations in original) (quoting Vladimir Putin), http://blog.oup.com/2015/05/fifa-and-the-
internationalisation-of-criminal-justice/ [https://perma.cc/7AEA-RY9L]. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See Fifa Corruption Crisis: Key Questions Answered, supra note 13. 
 74 See Cryer, supra note 71. 
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FIFA is a Swiss entity.75 Moreover, the allegations of corruption involve 
mostly foreign nationals and their conduct relating to events outside of the 
United States.76 Based on these facts, has the United States overstepped its 
boundaries?77 Is the DOJ indictment indeed an illegal exercise of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction?78  
A. The Legality of U.S. Jurisdiction 
The legality of the action taken by the United States is based in the 
fundamental concept of jurisdiction.79 Jurisdiction is divided into three dis-
tinct categories: jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to adjudicate, and ju-
risdiction to enforce.80 Jurisdiction to prescribe encompasses the ability of a 
country to make its law applicable to persons, conduct, and relations, 
whereas jurisdiction to adjudicate describes the ability to subject persons to 
the court and administrative process.81 Jurisdiction to enforce is defined as 
the ability to compel compliance, and punish noncompliance, with a coun-
try’s laws.82 
In this instance of investigation and charges, jurisdiction to prescribe is 
the applicable legal standard.83 In the sphere of international law, there are 
several recognized and agreed upon bases for asserting prescriptive jurisdic-
tion.84 The five bases of prescriptive jurisdiction are the protective princi-
                                                                                                                           
 75 See Who We Are, supra note 36. 
 76 See Cecily Rose, The FIFA Corruption Scandal from the Perspective of Public Interna-
tional Law, ASIL INSIGHTS (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/19/issue/23/fifa-
corruption-scandal-perspective-public-international-law [https://perma.cc/ES2W-7BBS]. 
 77 See Cryer, supra note 71. 
 78 See id. 
 79 See Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, Jurisdictional, Preliminary, and Procedural Concerns, BENCH
BOOK ON INT’L LAW (Diane Marie Amann ed., 2014), https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/
benchbook/jurisdiction.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MSU-YRD4]. 
 80 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 401 (AM. LAW INST. 1987); Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, supra note 79.  
 81 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 401(a), (b) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“[J]urisdiction to prescribe, i.e., to make its law applicable to 
the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by legis-
lation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a 
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ple, active personality, passive personality, universality, and territoriality.85 
Under the protective principle, jurisdiction may be exercised if the conduct 
at bar falls within a certain class of offenses aimed at a state’s security or 
interests, including but not limited to espionage and conspiracies to violate 
immigration laws.86 Active personality is based on the idea that a state 
should be able to regulate the conduct of its own nationals regardless of lo-
cation.87 Thus, as the name suggests, the relevant jurisdictional inquiry is 
the nationality of the actor or defendant.88 Jurisdiction supported by passive 
personality also hinges on who in particular is involved in the conduct.89 
While active personality depends on the nationality of the defendant, passive 
personality is based on the nationality of the person subject to the conduct.90 
The penultimate basis of jurisdiction, universality, is crime-specific.91 En-
capsulating the idea that some crimes, such as slavery, genocide, and tor-
ture, are so reprehensible to the international community as a whole, the 
principle of universality allows prosecution of such offenders by any state.92 
The final element of prescriptive jurisdiction is the principle of territo-
riality.93 Perhaps the most universally accepted basis of jurisdiction, the ter-
ritoriality principle allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over conduct that 
takes place within its borders.94 Additionally, territoriality typically encom-
passes what is known as the effects doctrine.95 This principle allows a state 
to assert jurisdiction on an actor whose outside conduct has actual or in-
tended effects within the state.96 It is this basis of jurisdiction that provides 
an answer to the concerns addressed by President Putin and the Russian 
Foreign Ministry.97 The United States, based on the widely recognized prin-
ciple of territoriality, is well within its rights to exercise jurisdiction over the 
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conduct of FIFA officials.98 The key to the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
United States in this case is the role played by American banks.99 
The DOJ indictment demonstrates that U.S. authorities are focusing 
solely on conduct that took place within national borders.100 According to the 
indictment, the FIFA officials and sports marketing executives who have been 
charged relied on the U.S. financial system to perpetuate their schemes.101 
Acting as part of a conspiracy, FIFA officials made use of U.S. financial 
institutions and wire services.102 The conspirators’ reliance on the U.S. fi-
nancial system “was significant and sustained and was one of the central 
methods and means through which they promoted and concealed their 
schemes.”103 Specifically, the indictment alleges that FIFA used U.S. 
branches of foreign banks to wire billions of dollars from accounts at Swiss 
banks into beneficiary accounts at U.S. banks.104 CONCACAF and CON-
MEBOL, two of FIFA’s six confederations, allegedly conducted business at 
Florida and New York branches of major U.S. and Swiss banks.105 The in-
dictment also describes similar conduct involving personal accounts of 
FIFA executives at California branches of major U.S. and Swiss financial 
institutions.106 In addition to the use of U.S. financial institutions and wire 
facilities, the conspirators depended on the overall stability of the U.S. fi-
nancial system and utilized access to private equity markets.107 The role of 
U.S. banks in facilitating the exchange of bribes and kickbacks therefore 
provides the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction and subsequent prosecu-
tion of FIFA officials in the United States.108 
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B. Beyond International Law 
While international law certainly supports the United States’ actions, 
domestic law is also applicable.109 In addition to U.S. prosecutors’ reliance 
on domestic financial institutions, another aspect of the indictment is worth 
noting.110 Although significant portions of the allegations focus on the ac-
ceptance of bribes for lucrative broadcasting rights, the charge of bribery is 
noticeably absent from the DOJ’s indictment.111 Rather than poor crafts-
manship on the part of the prosecutors, this absence is explained by the 
scope of federal law currently in place.112 Although classified as a crime in 
other countries, federal law does not presently criminalize the type of brib-
ery committed by those indicted.113 If the football officials charged were 
public officials, their crimes would be punishable under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA), which covers bribery of both foreign and domestic 
public officials.114 But, because FIFA and its confederations are private enti-
ties, the alleged bribery between football officials and marketing executives 
is classified as private-to-private bribery and is therefore outside the bounds 
of the FCPA.115 State law, rather than federal law, currently governs com-
mercial bribery or bribery limited to the private sector.116 
In place of bribery, the DOJ indictment charges FIFA officials with for-
ty-seven counts of criminal behavior including racketeering conspiracy, 
wire fraud conspiracy, wire fraud, money laundering conspiracy, money 
laundering, aiding and assisting in the preparation of false and fraudulent 
tax returns, and obstruction of justice.117 These allegations arise under the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).118 In order to 
proceed under RICO, the DOJ alleges that, due to decades of systemic cor-
ruption, FIFA has transformed from a sports federation into a criminal en-
terprise.119 Devised to combat and prevent criminal organizations from in-
filtrating legitimate businesses, RICO essentially requires proof of two ele-
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ments: first, that a defendant was a part of a criminal organization or enter-
prise and second, that a defendant committed two predicate criminal acts, 
which include bribery, wire fraud, and money laundering.120 If this burden 
of proof is met, the defendant is guilty of racketeering and is eligible for 
stricter sentencing as well as seizure of assets.121 
The involvement of U.S. banks, in addition to providing bases for the 
territoriality principle and certain predicate crimes required by RICO, also 
activates the Foreign Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.122 Article 
1 provides Congress with the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations.”123 This power is not absolute.124 It would not, for instance, reach 
corruption that is unrelated or unconnected to the United States.125 Again, 
the crucial link is the use of U.S. banks, wire services, and avenues of U.S. 
commerce.126 Specifically, the use of U.S. financial institutions qualifies the 
alleged corruption as involving both foreign nations and the United States, 
which satisfies the text of the Constitution.127 
On a larger scale, the indictment of FIFA officials from across the 
globe appears to be just one application of a “growing body of law that al-
lows the United States to prosecute foreign citizens.”128 This emerging trend 
stems from terrorism cases and actions taken in 2004 to broaden the use of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to combat terrorism.129 With regard to these cas-
es, broader laws, the diffusion of terrorist organizations, and less reliance on 
military detention has “led the United States to bring more foreigners onto 
its soil, some with only a tenuous link to the United States.”130 The federal 
prosecutor credited with working tirelessly to expand this international 
scope is former Attorney General and Brooklyn U.S. Attorney Loretta 
Lynch.131 Although it remains unclear how government prosecutions will 
change under recently-confirmed Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Lynch’s 
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involvement in the FIFA scandal could signal a shift towards aggressive 
pursuit of overseas cases at the DOJ.132 
III. ANALYSIS 
FIFA’s mission is develop football everywhere and for all, to touch the 
world through its inspiring tournaments and to build a better future 
through the power of the game.133 
Although its brief and lighthearted mission statement might suggest 
otherwise, the power of FIFA extends far beyond mere inspiration.134 The 
sport of football is a significant player in the global economy, as evidenced 
by the impact of football-related decisions on the world of big business.135 
Countries that are chosen to host the FIFA World Cup spend billions invest-
ing in development of their domestic infrastructure.136 The lucrative broad-
casting rights for the World Cup and other tournaments are fiercely con-
tended for, with executives resorting to bribes to acquire them.137 Consider-
ing its ability to substantially stir economic waters, the legal status of FIFA 
as a nonprofit association might seem surprising.138 Perhaps even more sur-
prising is the fact that FIFA generated almost $6 billion for itself in the last 
four years.139 As a major economic player with ties to nearly every part of 
the world, achieving accountability within the organization and among its 
leaders is critical for FIFA.140 A combination of legislative adjustments in 
Switzerland, active prosecution by U.S. authorities, and internal reform may 
prove to be a winning formula for lasting change.141 
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A. The Legal Status of Football’s Governing Body 
Headquartered in Zurich, FIFA is one of many international sporting 
institutions organized under Swiss law.142 With dozens of international and 
European organizations calling the country home, Switzerland has become 
a hub of international sports federations.143 Like many non-governmental 
organizations in Switzerland, FIFA is structured as a nonprofit associa-
tion.144 Governed generally by Articles 60 though 79 of the Swiss Civil 
Code, nonprofit associations—although their name might suggest other-
wise—are not prohibited from generating profit.145 These associations are 
prohibited, however, from distributing any profits to members.146 Any reve-
nue generated must be used in furtherance of the association’s nonprofit aim 
or mission.147 Moreover, Swiss law classifies these types of associations as 
bodies in their own right.148 Associations like FIFA, therefore, are legally 
allowed to employ a staff and execute agreements.149 Additionally, Swiss 
law requires FIFA and other associations to abide by certain formalities.150 
For example, associations are required to file articles of association and es-
tablish voting rights.151 Significantly, the Swiss Civil Code explicitly states 
that “[a]ssociations with a political, religious, scientific, cultural, charitable, 
social or other non-commercial purpose acquire legal personality as soon as 
their intention to exist as a corporate body is apparent from their articles of 
association.”152 
FIFA’s structure as an association under Swiss law is not without its 
benefits.153 This legal status allows FIFA to avoid practices that regular 
businesses must abide by.154 For example, FIFA is not required to publish its 
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financial accounts, enjoys exemption from domestic anti-corruption laws, 
and is given substantial freedom to administer its own affairs.155 Additional-
ly, FIFA does not pay taxes in Switzerland on the substantial revenue it gen-
erates from its quadrennial World Cup.156 To provide some perspective, the 
2010 World Cup in South Africa was responsible for nearly ninety percent 
of FIFA’s total revenue during that particular financial cycle.157 In dollars, 
that translates to roughly $3.5 billion—tax free.158 Moreover, FIFA manages 
to acquire very favorable tax concessions from each World Cup host coun-
try.159 In the words of a FIFA spokesman, “Any host country requires a 
comprehensive tax exemption to be given to FIFA and further parties in-
volved in the hosting and staging of an event.”160 
Although FIFA generally requires the details of a country’s bid docu-
ment to remain confidential, Holland and Belgium published their joint bid 
for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups publicly.161 The bid, published on the 
official website of the Dutch government, provides a tax exemption encom-
passing all revenue generated by FIFA and its subsidiaries.162 Perhaps un-
surprisingly, this setup has drawn extensive criticism.163 With huge sums of 
taxpayer money used to prepare for the World Cup, and FIFA bringing in 
billions in untaxed profits, the scales seem far from balanced.164 In fact, 
scholars have noted a “degree of suspicion in the minds of many people of 
global organisations who extract extensive concessions from the host gov-
ernment.”165 
In addition to being classified as a nonprofit and enjoying an extremely 
favorable tax status, FIFA is also categorically a non-governmental organi-
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zation.166 This status essentially means that, with the exception of Switzer-
land, no domestic governments have the power to subject FIFA to formal 
state authority.167 Therefore, notwithstanding FIFA’s omnipresence around 
the globe, domestic governments have very few, if any, tools at their dispos-
al regarding accountability of the organization.168 Despite wielding this al-
beit-limited power, Switzerland has stuck to its neutral roots and taken a 
laissez-faire approach regarding FIFA.169 Inaction on behalf of Swiss au-
thorities, coupled with the relative flexibility of Switzerland’s association 
law, has arguably paved the way for FIFA to slip into corruption.170 With 
deep pockets, unparalleled bargaining power, and little oversight, it is un-
surprising that FIFA officials have pushed the boundaries of legality.171 
B. A Structure That Fosters Corruption? 
Scholars have suggested that FIFA officials have been able to evade 
repercussions because football has historically been perceived as separate 
from politics.172 These scholars contend, however, that major events like the 
World Cup should be considered a matter of politics and public debate be-
cause they provide a rare chance for humanity to act as a global communi-
ty.173 Taking into account the organization’s significant power in the eco-
nomic sphere, as well as football’s unifying nature, one would expect FIFA 
to operate transparently and democratically.174 
Unfortunately, in light of the recent U.S. indictments, these expecta-
tions seem to reflect idealistic sentiment rather than reality.175 Continued 
investigation, some suggest, could reveal that football’s structural frame-
work itself is the problem.176 FIFA’s current structure favors its smaller, 
more easily corruptible member-states, placing these countries in a dispro-
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portionately powerful position.177 Currently, FIFA implements a “one mem-
ber, one vote” system in its Congress.178 Much like the U.S. Senate, this 
system, which grants the smallest member-states as much voting power as 
the largest member-states, is intended to maintain fairness and equal protec-
tion.179 It must be noted, however, that the analogy to the legislative branch 
is imperfect.180 Unlike the U.S. system, there is no body comparable to the 
House of Representatives within FIFA.181 Without population-based repre-
sentation, the outcome of FIFA’s structure is imbalanced democracy.182 To 
illustrate this concept, although China’s population is 250,000 times the size 
of Montserrat’s, both countries are equipped with equal voting power under 
FIFA’s current system.183 
For FIFA, promoting democracy while avoiding abuse has proved to 
be a difficult balancing act.184 The issue is twofold: the concentration of 
power within smaller member-states and the effects of funding.185 First, 
football power within smaller countries naturally rests in the hands of a se-
lect few.186 The smaller the group in which power is vested, the more sus-
ceptible a country’s votes are to corruption and bribery.187 The U.S. indict-
ment lends credence to this theory.188 Jeffrey Webb, for instance, is one of 
the many FIFA officials indicted.189 Webb is the president of the football 
association in the Cayman Islands, a nation with a population of less than 
60,000.190 Second, even legitimate funding from FIFA has the potential to 
influence the votes of smaller member-states.191 Not only does a relatively 
small amount of funding go a long way in smaller nations, but money that is 
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earmarked for development projects can easily be allocated elsewhere, in-
cluding the pockets of football officials.192 
C. Efforts Aimed at Accountability 
Examining FIFA’s turbulent history logically raises the question of how 
the international organization can be held accountable.193 With allegations of 
FIFA’s corruption now spanning decades, the body of scholarly discourse re-
garding a proper remedy continues to grow.194 Despite deep-rooted and en-
during accusations of misconduct, FIFA has, until very recently, made few 
changes.195 For example, the organization’s former president, Sepp Blatter, 
enjoyed a long tenure amidst these allegations.196 Scholars have set forth a 
laundry list of factors that make greater accountability especially challeng-
ing.197 In particular, FIFA’s structure and organization make it immune to var-
ious accountability mechanisms.198 Although FIFA’s most recent reform ef-
fort has somewhat curbed the power of the president, the organization has 
historically lacked hierarchical accountability.199 Supervisory accountability 
is limited by FIFA’s statutes, which discourage oversight from national gov-
ernments by allowing FIFA to suspend national football associations for any 
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interference.200 Moreover, due to the fact that FIFA is not required under 
Swiss law to publish its financial accounts, fiscal accountability is nearly im-
possible.201 Market accountability, or the impact of financial backers and con-
sumers on decision-making, has proven to be ineffective as well.202 Although 
FIFA is affiliated with corporate giants like Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, Visa, 
and Adidas, none seem willing to do more than issue public-friendly state-
ments of concern.203 Additionally, the immense global popularity of football 
makes public reputational accountability unlikely, as fans “care about what 
happens on the pitch, and not in the smoky back rooms of football govern-
ance.”204 
D. A Formula for Lasting Change 
1. Enhanced Swiss Legislation 
In the end, the best mechanism for holding FIFA responsible is legal 
accountability.205 The respective investigations launched by the United 
States and Switzerland are undoubtedly steps in the right direction.206 In 
fact, recent actions taken by Swiss lawmakers suggest the country’s histori-
cally hands-off approach to FIFA may be a thing of the past.207 Approved by 
the Swiss Parliament in September 2015, a new law, aptly named “Lex 
FIFA” or “the FIFA law,” enhances existing corruption laws by making the 
offer or acceptance of a bribe an automatic criminal offense.208 The pun-
ishment is a maximum three-year jail sentence and the new law gives Swiss 
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authorities the power to sanction sports federations specifically.209 Roland 
Büchel, a Swiss legislator and notoriously fierce critic of FIFA, is optimistic 
about the efficacy of Lex FIFA, characterizing the law as “strong enough to 
sanction corruption in sports federations like FIFA in the future.”210 Prior to 
the enactment of this new law, Swiss investigations into private corruption 
could only be initiated if an individual within the organization filed a com-
plaint.211 
The most recent change to Swiss law builds upon a set of legal 
measures designed to improve overall supervision of sports federations.212 A 
law passed by the Swiss parliament in December 2014 increased the level 
of scrutiny that can be applied to the bank accounts of sports officials.213 
The leaders of sports organizations, including FIFA’s president, are now 
classified as “politically exposed persons” subject to corruption investiga-
tions.214 Although scholars agree that the recent Swiss legislation is an im-
portant progression, most contend that more is needed, namely increasing 
the resources of the Swiss Federal Prosecutor’s Office, establishing laws 
that protect whistleblowers, and reworking Swiss association law.215 
2. U.S. Prosecution Through RICO and Anti-Bribery Legislation 
While Switzerland is the most logical place for a shift towards more 
oversight to take its roots, other countries where FIFA has a presence should 
follow suit.216 In addition to prosecution of FIFA officials under RICO, im-
plementation of anti-bribery legislation could bolster U.S. efforts and estab-
lish more effective avenues to tackle corruption in the future.217 Scholars 
suggest that the passage of a federal law criminalizing commercial, or pri-
vate-to-private bribery could “further enhance the ability of prosecutors to 
target this type of conduct, particularly if Congress gave the law an extrater-
ritorial scope.”218 From a public reputation standpoint, charging FIFA offi-
cials with bribery would likely draw more social contempt than a charge of 
wire fraud.219 Additionally, the United States and other countries where 
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FIFA has a presence could enact legislation restricting or even prohibiting 
domestic corporations from providing financial support to FIFA.220 Threat-
ened use of this tactic proved effective in combating a corruption scandal 
within the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in the late 1990s and 
could provide countries other than Switzerland with some degree of gov-
ernmental authority over FIFA.221 
3. Internal Reform 
The ongoing American and Swiss investigations have already accom-
plished a great deal.222 After all, it is one thing to implement legislation to 
regulate powerful international organizations like FIFA, but it is quite an-
other to actively attack corruption and pursue criminal charges.223 While the 
DOJ investigation has set its sights on the historical corruption of FIFA, FBI 
and Swiss authorities plan to delve deeper into the bidding process behind 
the Russia and Qatar World Cups.224 Although this application of pressure 
by the U.S. and Swiss governments will increase the legal accountability of 
FIFA, the organization itself ultimately possesses the power to bring about 
the most substantial change.225 Prior to the approval of reform measures in 
February 2016, FIFA had utterly failed in this regard.226 A reform process 
undertaken by FIFA in 2013 appeared on its face to be a genuine attempt to 
implement change, but in reality did “little more than polish the veneer on 
an outdated men’s club.”227 Similar to efforts employed by the IOC, an In-
dependent Governance Committee (IGC) was established by FIFA.228 In the 
end, however, FIFA rejected the Committee’s nominations for key executive 
positions within the organization.229 Propositions by the IGC to add inde-
pendent members to FIFA’s Executive Committee and establish a back-
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ground review process for new candidates for senior positions were also 
shot down.230 Complete rejection of other IGC recommendations, including 
disclosure of compensation and term limits for key FIFA positions, suggests 
that, at the time, FIFA was more interested in the good publicity that a re-
form effort might bring rather than the actual reform itself.231 
Critics initially characterized FIFA’s most recent reform effort as more 
of the same.232 The reform committee, which was convened in September 
2015, was criticized for its membership of “football and Olympic insiders 
and officials, all of whom have an implicit conflict of interest through their 
roles as well as a vested interest in maintaining as much of the status quo as 
they can get away with.”233 Nevertheless, despite the committee’s makeup, 
it produced a number of substantial and thoughtful recommendations.234 
These measures, approved by the FIFA Congress in February 2016, were 
incorporated into a revised version of the FIFA Statutes.235 First and fore-
most, the reforms established the FIFA Council as a replacement for the 
Executive Committee.236 The tandem of the newly formed Council, which 
will serve as a supervisory, strategic body, and the General Secretariat, 
which will function in a managerial, executive role, is meant to ensure a 
true separation of powers.237 Under this new structure, the president will 
hold less power and will act in a more ambassadorial capacity.238 Signifi-
cantly, the Council will include a minimum of six female representatives—
at least one for each confederation.239 In addition, candidates for the FIFA 
Council will undergo “comprehensive eligibility and integrity checks con-
ducted by an independent FIFA Review Committee.”240 The reforms also 
institute term limits for the FIFA President and FIFA Council members—the 
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maximum incumbency is now twelve years or three terms of four years.241 
Other notable changes include annual disclosure of salaries of key executives 
and a “commitment to human rights to be enshrined in the FIFA Statutes.”242 
Now that these substantial reforms have been implemented—the chang-
es came into effect sixty days after adoption—FIFA’s focus must shift to-
wards meaningful enforcement.243 Additionally, although the reform pack-
age is a sign of significant progress for football’s governing body, FIFA 
would benefit from a change to its current voting process.244 FIFA’s current 
“one member, one vote” system fosters imbalanced democracy by favoring 
its smaller, more easily corruptible member-states.245 Imposing a popula-
tion-based voting right could correct this imbalance and ensure that smaller 
countries are no longer disproportionately favored.246 While more can al-
ways be done, internal changes at FIFA—combined with enhanced Swiss 
law and active U.S. prosecution—mark a meaningful step forward on what 
will likely be a long road toward renewing the trust and respect of the glob-
al football community.247 
CONCLUSION 
The recent FIFA scandal is yet another black mark on the governing 
body of the world’s most beloved sport. As the investigations launched by 
U.S. and Swiss authorities seek to hold responsible those executives in-
volved, it has never been clearer that FIFA as an organization is in dire need 
of reform. Although FIFA’s unique orientation within the sphere of interna-
tional law and its favorable legal status under Swiss law make matters more 
complicated, accountability of the organization is not implausible. Domesti-
cally, recent Swiss legislation has armed authorities with more teeth, putting 
law enforcement on the offensive. In addition to U.S. prosecution under 
RICO, implementation of federal anti-bribery legislation would enhance the 
ability of prosecutors to combat future corruption. In the end, however, 
FIFA alone has the greatest power to shape its future. Along with continued 
application of pressure by Switzerland and the United States, meaningful 
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enforcement of the recently adopted reform package—and additional re-
forms going forward—may be enough to set FIFA on the right track. Alt-
hough FIFA’s future is shrouded in uncertainty, one thing is clear: football 
fans certainly deserve better. 
  
 
